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ABSTRACT 
Emotions constitute an integral part of the diverse approaches 
that we bring to bear upon our most pressing law and policy issues. 
This article explores the role of emotions in intellectual property, 
information, and technology law (IP). Like other areas of law, IP 
commits to, prioritizes, and even honors, reason, logic, and facts—
which can result in the sidelining of the affective components of law. 
Yet our affective responses to legal and other phenomena influence 
both cognition and reason. Part I of the article provides a general 
overview of the field of law and emotions, pointing out how this 
approach to understanding law already exists, albeit still mostly 
* Donald & Lynda Horowitz Professor for the Pursuit of Justice, and former Associate Dean for
Research at Seattle University School of Law. Many thanks to the hosts of the University of Akron
School of Law Fall 2020 Intellectual Property Scholars Forum for the invitation. This article
originated as “IP Romances,” a tribute to Peter A. Jaszi for the 7th Peter A. Jaszi lecture at Washington 
College of Law, in 2018; it was presented also at the 2019 Suffolk University Intellectual Property
and Innovation Conference. It benefited from generous comments made by participants at all these
events, as well as subsequent readings by Deidré A. Keller, Lateef Mtima, and Rich Schur. Thanks to 
Jenny Wu (Seattle University School of Law Class of 2021) for her excellent research support. 
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incipiently, within IP. For example, our affective responses help to 
reinforce one of our main assumptions about IP: that legal 
incentives, such as copyrights and patents, motivate authors and 
inventors to create their respective works and inventions. In Part II, 
the article illustrates the operation of two specific emotions—
nostalgia and hope—to demonstrate how an intentional analysis of 
emotions can impact IP law and policy. These two examples 
demonstrate that understanding how emotions undergird affect, 
attachment, attention, attraction, and repulsion for all areas of IP 
knowledge production is an essential first step to addressing our 
currently pervasive knowledge asymmetries, biases, and omissions. 
Put negatively, if we continue to ignore or minimize emotions in IP, 
we also will continue to risk an incomplete conceptual 
configuration of IP, at the cost of thwarting the primary policy goals 
of this increasingly crucial area of law.  
I. INTRODUCTION
This article explores the role of emotions in intellectual property, 
information, and technology law (IP). Like other areas of law, IP commits 
to, prioritizes, and even honors, reason, logic, and facts—which can result 
in the sidelining of the affective components of law.1 The field of law and 
emotions2 can help to illuminate IP, yielding new approaches and insights. 
Emotions constitute an integral part of the diverse approaches that 
we bring to bear upon our most pressing law and policy issues. Our 
affective responses to legal and other phenomena are inseparable from our 
other ways of comprehending them. A leading voice in the field of law 
and emotions, Terry Maroney, has pronounced that “[o]ver the course of 
the last two decades the traditional narrative casting law as a bastion of 
pure reason has begun to crumble. As it crumbles we are freed to explore 
the deep interconnectedness of emotion and cognition in the theory and 
practice of law.”3 And as Robin West has observed: 
1. Kathryn Abrams & Hila Keren, Who’s Afraid of Law and the Emotions?, 94 MINN. L. REV. 
1997, 2021 (2010) (citing GRANT GILMORE, THE DEATH OF CONTRACT 109 n. 22 (1974) (quoting 
from Christopher Columbus Langdell) (“It was indispensable to establish at least two things; first that 
law is a science; . . . “)). 
2. See e.g., THE PASSIONS OF LAW (Susan Bandes, ed., 1999). 
3. Terry A. Maroney, A Field Evolves: Introduction to the Special Section on Law and
Emotion, 8 EMOTION REV. 3, 4 (2015) [hereinafter Maroney, Field Evolves] (“People have emotions 
about law itself, ranging from revulsion to reverence. Abrams and Keren set forth a helpful frame 
within which to understand this constellation of interactions. Law and emotion scholarship seeks to 
illuminate the affective features of legal problems; investigate these features through interdisciplinary 
analysis; and integrate resulting understandings into practical, normative proposals.” (internal citation 
2
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At least sometimes and to some degree, and sometimes for better while 
often for worse . . . all sorts of legal actors—legislators, judges, jurors, 
litigants, private contractors, city council members, drafters of 
constitutions, the authors of universal declarations of rights, and of 
course lawyers and legal scholars as well—are moved toward our 
legalistic decisions or our artful legal arguments by the force of our 
passions, rather than by the moral force of either shared or neutral 
principles, deductions from the natural law, inferences from past 
precedent, or a toting of societal costs and benefits.4 
This is not to say that emotions can be dichotomized wholly from 
cognition or reason, as will be explored further below. Rather, it is to 
underscore that the IP community may have systematically overlooked a 
powerful means for understanding our policy choices, because the 
affective turn in law may not be as readily apparent in IP as it has been in 
other areas.5 
Influenced by these insights and others described below, this article 
proceeds in two parts. Part I provides a general overview of the field of 
law and emotions, pointing out how this approach to understanding law 
already exists, albeit still mostly incipiently, within IP. For example, our 
affective responses help to reinforce one of our main assumptions about 
IP: that legal incentives, such as copyrights and patents, motivate authors 
and inventors to create their respective works and inventions.6 In part II, 
the article illustrates the operation of two specific emotions—nostalgia 
and hope—to demonstrate how an intentional analysis of emotions can 
impact IP law and policy. These two examples demonstrate that 
understanding how emotions undergird affect, attachment, attraction, 
repulsion, and attention for all areas of IP knowledge production is an 
essential first step to addressing our currently pervasive knowledge 
asymmetries, biases, and omissions. 
A caveat: within the limited scope of this article, it is not possible to 
summarize and review the entire corpus of law and emotions scholarship. 
But it is possible to point out some of the cogent reasons why this field 
can expand our understanding of IP. At the very least, the relationship of 
emotions to IP is worth exploring for ways in which it can challenge our 
collective bias toward a primarily reason-based account of the law. 
omitted). See also Terry A. Maroney, Law and Emotion: A Proposed Taxonomy of an Emerging Field, 
30 L. HUM. BEHAV. 119 (2006).  
4. Robin West, Law’s Emotions, 19 RICH. J.L. & PUB. INT. 339, 340 (2016).
5. See Anjali Vats & Deidré A. Keller, Critical Race IP, 36 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 735, 
779–87 (2018), (describing the “affective turn” in law, particularly as applied to critical race theory). 
6. See Lateef Mtima, IP Social Justice Theory: Access, Inclusion, and Empowerment, 55
GONZ. L. REV. 401 (2019) (summarizing and criticizing this overarching normative assumption). 
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Moreover, greater appreciation and integration of emotion, along with 
cognition and reason, may be critical to improving the quality of our 
knowledge, developing effective responses to our current legal and policy 
conundrums, and re-orienting our individual and collective imaginations 
of IP’s potential in response to currently unimagined technologies. 
II. IP AND EMOTIONS: WHAT ARE THE CONNECTIONS?
As we already know, the world outside of the law is not bound to the 
reason-driven parameters that guide lawyers. Indeed, emotion-driven 
decisions based on power, rather than considered policy, take place ever 
more explicitly within our constitutional democracy.7 This section begins 
exploring where emotions are located within IP despite our not paying 
close attention. 
A. Three-Legged Stool? Emotion, Cognition, and Reason
Regardless of any political differences, lawyers and others trained in
law likely agree upon an ideal of law that prioritizes reason over emotion.8 
Influenced by the scientific tradition, this ideal often includes not only an 
emphasis on logical reasoning but also a framework of evidence-based 
legal decision-making within over-arching constitutional values such as 
due process as well as market values such as efficiency. Whether law is 
pronounced by courts or legislatures, or whether a legal position is 
espoused by a litigator or a government regulator, a consensus exists in 
the legal community that law and policymaking should be based 
primarily, if not wholly, on these reason-based attributes.9 
7. See, e.g., Nicholas Fandos & Emily Cochrane, After Pro-Trump Mob Storms Capitol,
Congress Confirms Biden’s Win, N.Y. TIMES (Jan. 6, 2021), https://www.nytimes.com/
2021/01/06/us/politics/congress-gop-subvert-election.html [https://perma.cc/C6W2-G23D].  
8. See Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2003–04. They write:
The detachment of legal rationality reflected the historic view of law as a quasi-science: a 
process of deducing, from a framework of legal principles, the rule to be applied to a
particular case. A detached, rationalist stance also served to insulate judges from pressure 
by the political branches or from undue sympathy with one or more of the parties. Emotion 
floods careful, stagewise reasoning in a tidal wave of affect; its association with particulars 
sweeps decisionmakers from their impersonal, Archimedean pedestal. 
Id. 
9. But see OLIVER WENDELL HOLMES, JR., THE COMMON LAW 1 (Dover Publications, Inc.
1991) (1881) Holmes wrote:  
The life of the law has not been logic: it has been experience. The felt necessities of the 
time, the prevalent moral and political theories, intuitions of public policy, avowed or 
unconscious, and even the prejudices which judges share with their fellow-men, have had 
a good deal more to do than the syllogism in determining the rules by which men should 
be governed. 
4
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Whether in legal practice, policy, doctrine, or scholarship, emotions 
typically occupy a subordinate space, if they are acknowledged at all. Yet 
each person’s encounters with law are prefigured by earlier and present 
emotional experiences. Our individual views about IP, for example, are 
based not only on our predispositions as well as family and cultural 
histories but also, profoundly, on our emotions. These early views are 
shaped by subsequent influencers such as advisors, colleagues, idols, 
mentors, and on the flip side, the deluded, misguided, and misinformed 
people we disagree with, and the rogues and scoundrels who represent the 
things we don’t admire in the least. These various culturally and socially 
contingent responses provide the substrate for our basic understandings of 
IP.10 
Emotions shape our responses to, and understanding of, law. Law in 
turn shapes, or even produces, emotions.11 Not to be conflated entirely 
with cognitive responses, emotions are affective responses. Some 
researchers view cognition and emotion as largely separable, whereas 
others do not.12 For example, Ellsworth and Dougherty endorse appraisal 
theory, which views emotion as one of the key drivers of cognition.13 
While affective responses can influence cognition, and vice versa, 
the degree of separability is not at all clear.14 However, Abrams and Keren 
Id. at 1. 
10. Lisa Larrimore Ouellette, Cultural Cognition of Patents, 4 IP THEORY 28, 31 (2013)
(describing a cultural cognition framework where “we form beliefs that cohere with the values of 
groups we identify with.”). 
11. Maroney, Field Evolves, supra note 3, at 4 (“All approaches take as their bedrock the same 
notion: emotion shapes law, and law needs to get emotion right in order to function well. The dynamic 
also runs in the other direction: law shapes emotion.”); see generally West, supra note 4. 
12. Phoebe C. Ellsworth & Adrienne Dougherty, Appraisals and Reappraisals in the
Courtroom, 8 EMOTION REV. 20, 20–21 (2016) (outlining four main theories of emotions, including 
basic emotions theory, valence/arousal emotions theory, constructivist theory, and appraisal theory). 
13. Id. at 21. (“According to appraisal theorists, emotion and cognition are mostly inseparable. 
Few emotional experiences occur without cognition, and few thoughts are completely free of emotion. 
Emotions are combinations of appraisals. A change in an appraisal is a change in emotion, and a 
change in emotion is a change in appraisal.”) (citation omitted). 
14. Laura R. Bradford, Emotion, Dilution, and the Trademark Consumer, 23 BERKELEY TECH. 
L.J. 1227, 1260–62 (2008). Bradford writes:
Emotions are part of the nervous system, arising from evolutionarily old parts of the 
mammalian brain that propel behavior in historically advantageous ways. Emotions 
generally identify goals and desires, leading individuals to pursue those desires in 
conscious and subconscious ways. . . . Scientists have posited the existence of “somatic 
markers” that lead us to classify stimuli as “good” or “bad” as we experience them. We 
retrieve these feelings again upon encountering or remembering a known object or 
situation. Without such somatic tones we might be paralyzed by inaction. The pleasant or 
unpleasant sensation attached to an image leads the body to react instinctively, much in 
the same way it reacts unconsciously to hunger, pain, fatigue, or other internal stimuli. 
Such reactions happen automatically and cause an instant reaction without conscious 
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claim that the affective components of law are undervalued resources in 
their own right, relative to cognitive science as well as to law and 
neuroscience, and that this under-emphasis is due to “certain rationalist 
and objectivist assumptions that traditional legal thought 
embraces . . . .”15 According to them, a separate consideration of emotion 
per se is important.16 
In IP, as elsewhere in law, the behavioral economics revolution has 
resulted in the mainstream acknowledgment of cognition as a legitimate 
subject of inquiry.17 Cognitive science has gained a strong foothold in IP, 
especially through the behavioral economics strand of law and economics. 
Yet, cognition, emotion, and reason are mutually constitutive.18 As Laura 
Bradford, one of the few IP scholars to examine intentionally the role of 
emotion in IP doctrine, states: 
Because individuals are not always aware of the degree of attraction or 
aversion (the “emotional valence”) they may harbor toward a specific 
object or event, emotion can act as an unconscious shortcut or heuristic. 
Individuals are drawn to one option, ignoring or dismissing the rest, for 
reasons they cannot consciously describe.19 
This is a very different insight than those gleaned from cognitive science 
or neuroscience,20 as related as those fields are.21 
thought. Scientists theorize that such mechanisms enabled primitive humans to run when 
they encountered dangerous situations without first having to pause to plan how to react. 
In the same way, modern humans rely on somatic tones in weighing abstract outcomes. 
We are instinctively drawn in or repulsed by the affective markers our experiences have 
assigned to each outcome. Thus, emotion is what gives us the impetus to make decisions. 
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
15. Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2018.
16. See id. at 2032–33.
17. See, e.g., Dennis D. Crouch, The Patent Lottery: Exploiting Behavioral Economics for the 
Common Good, 16 GEO. MASON L. REV. 141 (2008). Abrams and Keren observe:  
[M]uch of behavioral law and economics analysis does not analyze responses that we
would describe as emotions, but focuses rather on nonaffective cognitive assumptions that 
depart from rationality. In that sense the domain of behavioral law and economics overlaps 
with, but is not coterminous with, that of law and emotions. 
Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2020.  
18. Bradford, supra note 14, at 1260 (“[a] growing body of literature suggests that emotions 
do not operate in opposition to reason, but are in fact critical to any form of decision-making.”).  
19. Id. at 1262. 
20. See Amanda S. Bruce, Jared M. Bruce, William R. Black, Rebecca J. Lepping, Janice M.
Henry, Joseph Bradley C. Cherry, Laura E. Martin, Vlad B. Papa, Ann M. Davis, William M. Brooks 
& Cary R. Savage, Branding and a Child’s Brain: An fMRI Study of Neural Responses to Logos, 9 
SOC. COGNITIVE & AFFECTIVE NEUROSCI. 118 (2014) (neuroimaging study motivated by 
understanding the intense marketing toward youth driven by companies’ ambitions for brand 
recognition, preference, and loyalty). 
21. See Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2032–33. Abrams and Keren opine: 
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When emotions are acknowledged in IP, they are almost always 
subsumed within a cognitive science framework, cast as an improved 
variation of pure utilitarianism.22 This echoes efforts by non-IP scholars 
to treat emotional responses as measurable deviations from the choices 
made by a rational actor.23 For example, some IP scholars have recent 
evaluated the relation of happiness and well-being to IP law and policy.24 
In this work, the emotion of happiness is treated as a supplement to, or 
substitute for, consumer preferences measured within a utilitarian 
scaffolding. Some IP scholars have even considered but rejected 
incorporating the variable of emotion in their economic analyses of 
preferences, apparently believing that emotion is a trivial factor.25 
Unsurprisingly, trademark law includes more analysis of emotion 
than do the other areas of IP, due to the clear linkages between trademarks 
and marketing.26 Of course, marketing strategies rely heavily on consumer 
Undoubtedly, we need the work of behavioral economics to analyze flawed heuristics, and 
create “choice architecture” that facilitates rational decisionmaking.  
Similarly, we need neuroscience to help us understand the brain mechanisms that shape 
the human cognition and its limitations, and to glimpse the ways in which these patterns 
might be germane to legal decisionmaking. But, despite the rationalist and objectivist 
premises that continue to ground legal instincts, we also need a broader and more diverse 
set of resources from disciplines such as anthropology, sociology, psychology, cultural 
studies, philosophy, and literature. . . [e]motions [are] not simply . . . temporary deviations 
from rationality (behavioral studies) or . . . forms of neural function (brain studies), but 
also, at times, . . . distinct and significant supplemental means of apprehending the world.  
Id. (footnotes omitted). 
22. See, e.g., Bradford, supra note 14, at 1258. 
23. See, e.g., Eric Posner, Law and the Emotions, 89 GEO. L.J. 1977 (2001). 
24. Christopher Buccafusco & Jonathan S. Masur, Intellectual Property Law and the
Promotion of Welfare, in RESEARCH HANDBOOK ON THE ECONOMICS OF INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 
LAW (VOL. I: THEORY) 98 (Ben Depoorter & Peter Menell eds., 2019)) (“The personal bond between 
creators and their works is recognized as particularly strong in comparison to the general level of 
attachment that owners may develop towards their goods.”); accord Estelle Derclaye, Chapter 7. 
What can intellectual property law learn from happiness research?, in METHODS AND PERSPECTIVES 
IN INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY 177, 191 (Graeme B. Dinwoodie ed., 2013) (“In sum, economic growth 
should no longer be a major goal. Governments should perform a different type of cost–benefit 
analysis (namely choose those policies that will increase happiness the most for any given cost). Some 
propose to even move from a cost–benefit analysis to a well-being analysis.”). 
25. Christopher Buccafusco & Christopher Sprigman, Valuing Intellectual Property: An
Experiment, 96 CORNELL L. REV. 1, 43 (2010) (noting that “[w]hile there might be good reasons to 
credit creators’ valuations if they are the result of regret aversion or enhanced feelings of emotional 
attachment, we can see no valid reason for respecting pricing decisions that are driven almost 
exclusively by irrational biases.”); but see Ofer Tur-Sinai, The Endowment Effect in IP Transactions: 
The Case Against Debiasing, 18 MICH. TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. 117 (2011) (critiquing the 
decision by Buccafusco & Sprigman to ignore impact of emotion in their experimental research). 
26. See, e.g., Bernd Schmitt, The Consumer Psychology of Brands, 22 J. CONSUMER PSYCHOL. 
7 (2012).  
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psychology, including its affective components.27 And as Leah Chan 
Grinvold has pointed out, allegations of trademark infringement involve 
the possibility of shaming in response to trademark enforcement.28 But all 
areas of IP, and all heuristics that IP legal actors employ, involve emotion, 
to a greater or lesser extent. 
Furthermore, emotion-driven decisions regarding IP are not merely 
private decisions that have no consequence outside of one’s own 
individual preference set, but rather form collective emotional preferences 
that lead to what could be called a culture of IP.29 Susan Bandes, another 
pioneer in the area of law and emotions, along with her co-author Jeremy 
Blumenthal, point out: 
Emotions are social processes that arise, in part, through interactions or 
anticipated interactions with others. They both influence and are 
influenced by social, cultural, and institutional context. . . . Emotions 
such as shame, fear, trust, and the desire for approval are intimately 
involved in the development, communication, and enforcement of the 
norms animating law.30 
That is, law and emotions scholars emphasize the inherently 
communal quality of emotions. 
If these insights have any traction, then how do emotions inform the 
particular assumptions, biases, and motivations of legal actors within the 
IP community? People specialize in IP for many reasons. IP revolves 
around powerful cultural memes of the author, creator, inventor, as well 
27. See Bradford, supra note 14, at 1233–35; Rebecca Tushnet, Gone in Sixty Milliseconds:
Trademark Law and Cognitive Science, 86 TEX. L. REV. 507 (2008). Bradford observes: 
[T]rademark dilution law is so difficult to understand because it aims at emotion and only 
indirectly at information. The emotion referred to here is of the most basic kind: “affect” 
or the automatic negative or positive response that a mark generates when viewed by a
consumer. . . . The emotion literature suggests, in contradiction to the claims of dilution
regulation proponents, that much of the “selling power” of famous marks is due primarily 
to their familiarity and not any specific benefit, tangible or intangible, of the product. 
Bradford, supra note 14, at 1233–35 (footnotes omitted). Furthermore: 
Experiments have confirmed that repeated exposure to a stimulus alone increases positive 
feelings toward the stimulus. This is known as the “mere exposure” effect. The dominant 
explanation for the “mere exposure” effect is that the positive reaction to familiar stimuli 
is a function of ease of recall rather than a conscious appraisal of prior experience with the 
stimulus [in low involvement conditions].  
Id. at 1266–67. 
28. Leah Chan Grinvald, Shaming Trademark Bullies, 2011 WIS. L. REV. 625, 687 (2011). 
29. As C.P. Snow put it, speaking of physical scientists: “Without thinking about it, they
respond alike. That is what culture means.” C.P. SNOW, THE TWO CULTURES AND THE SCIENTIFIC 
REVOLUTION 11 (1959). 
30. Susan A. Bandes & Jeremy A. Blumenthal, Emotion and the Law, 8 ANN. REV. L. & SOC. 
SCI. 161, 172 (2012) (citation omitted). 
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as entrepreneurship, innovation, and progress. These robust concepts have 
both overt and implicit positive emotional associations to most people, 
including those whose work revolves around IP. Most IP legal actors 
believe that they are doing good (or at least doing no harm), and IP’s 
emotional penumbra is a good place to find oneself aligned with this 
overall goal. These individual beliefs tend to produce and reproduce 
positive affective or emotional responses. 
Our individual and communal passions may not be dangerous in and 
of themselves. They serve constructive purposes, such as motivating us to 
action. But they also may interfere with our fuller understanding of how 
IP intersects with cultural, political, and social context to further the 
underlying purposes of IP: for example, to “promote Progress”31 for the 
overall social good. 
Furthermore, unacknowledged and emotionally-laden idealizations 
about IP assume certain conventions as starting points, which then can be 
semi-impervious to challenge or reconsideration. In other words, they 
tend to reinforce the status quo. As critical race scholar Anjali Vats 
recently observed about IP: 
[A]nxieties about race, nation, and citizenship developed in ways that
were mutually constitutive with anxieties about knowledge production,
labor, and economics. . . . Intellectual property law is bound up with
narratives of race, nation, and citizenship, as well as their attendant
“structures of feeling” . . . .32
B. Locating Emotions in IP: A Brief Survey
What are the results of the collective emotional investments of IP
legal actors? One example can be found in our discussions and debates 
over incentive theory. The positive emotional attachments (and related 
cognitive commitments) to the incentive explanation for IP may obscure 
our field’s full acceptance of evidence to the contrary. Furthermore, we 
31. U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8. 
32. ANJALI VATS, THE COLOR OF CREATORSHIP: INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY, RACE, AND THE 
MAKING OF AMERICANS 7 (2020). Vats further states:  
[S]hared feelings are what bring individuals together and “bind the imagined white subject 
and nation together.” Shared feelings among white men about how intellectual property
law should work and who should benefit from its legal determinations were wrapped up
with racial ideals of citizenship and national identity, in a manner that coalesced to produce 
apparently race neutral legal decisions and economic policies.
Id. at 31 (quoting Sara Ahmed). 
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may overlook the many ways in which emotions undergird many other 
areas of IP, whether law on the books or “in action.”33 
In copyright, the conventional frame idealizes or mythologizes the 
individual creative genius—what Peter Jaszi and others have termed 
Romantic Authorship34—despite ample evidence of creativity without the 
need for, or even despite, the copyright incentive. This countervailing 
evidence includes, for example, Glynn Lunney’s empirical quantitative 
research of musical works showing that incentive theory does not 
adequately describe the actual output of twentieth-century musical works 
affected by the reward of copyright.35 Paul Heald’s research suggests the 
same regarding the availability of books.36 Relatedly, Jessica Silbey’s 
interviews with various scientists, engineers, musicians, artists, as well as 
their lawyers, demonstrates the mismatch between the dominant incentive 
theory and motivations for creativity and invention on the ground.37 
Analogously, patent law clings to its sole-inventor origin stories38 
despite evidence of increasing activities by non-practicing entities, the 
prevalence of simultaneous invention, and the treatment of patents as an 
asset or investment rather than an incentive.39 Nonetheless incentive 
theory—and an arguable over-investment in its continued validation and 
success—continues to dominate the IP knowledge communities even as it 
arguably deflects attention away from other ways of framing, knowing, 
and shaping knowledge systems. 
From perspectives outside of law and emotions, IP scholars have 
explained these attachments to incentive theory as deliberate cover for 
other ends, such as maximizing rent-seeking by powerful interest groups 
like copyright industries and owners.40 Others view these affinities as 
33. Roscoe Pound, Law in Books and Law in Action, 44 AM. L. REV. 12, 12 (1910); Bill Clune, 
Law in Action and Law on the Books: A Primer, NEW LEGAL REALISM: EMPIRICAL L. & SOC’Y (June 
12, 2013), http://newlegalrealism.org/2013/06/12/law-inaction-and-law-on-the-books-a-primer/ 
[https://perma.cc/59Y6-2T5R]. 
34. Peter Jaszi, Toward a Theory of Copyright: The Metamorphoses of “Authorship”, 1991 
DUKE L.J. 455 (1991). 
35. GLYNN LUNNEY, COPYRIGHT’S EXCESS: MONEY AND MUSIC IN THE US RECORDING 
INDUSTRY (2018). 
36. PAUL HEALD, COPY THIS BOOK!: WHAT DATA TELLS US ABOUT COPYRIGHT AND THE
PUBLIC GOOD (2020). 
37. JESSICA SILBEY, THE EUREKA MYTH (2015). 
38. Mark A. Lemley, The Myth of the Sole Inventor, 110 MICH. L. REV. 709, 710 (2012). 
39. Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Susy Frankel, From Incentive to Commodity to Asset: How
International Law is Reconceptualizing Intellectual Property, 36 MICH. J. INT’L L. 557, 560 (2015). 
40. Jaszi, supra note 34, at 500–01 (“‘[A]uthorship’ has remained what it was in eighteenth-
century England—a stalking horse for economic interests that were (as a tactical matter) better 
concealed than revealed, and a convenient generative metaphor for legal structures that facilitated the 
emergence of new modes of production for literary and artistic works.”). 
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cognitively driven by prior cultural commitments,41 or even by faith-
based belief, akin to religious belief.42 Drawing on the work of Thurman 
Arnold, part of the Yale legal realist group and a founding member of 
Arnold & Porter, Shyamkrishna Balaganesh touches upon IP and 
emotions when he points to the function of conceptual vessels like 
“author” or “inventor” as “emotionally important social symbols”43 that 
mediate between institutional ideals and the realities on the ground—
thereby resolving for insiders the contradictions, incongruities, and 
incommensurabilities in institutional practices. 
In addition to these likely explanations, one can view this attachment 
to incentive theory from the perspective of emotions—including affect 
and attachment. Those in IP may “know” that IP provides incentives for 
creative and inventive activity because we want to feel (rather than know) 
that we’re doing the right thing with our efforts. Colloquially, we may like 
the “buzz” we get when we think that legal incentives make a difference, 
that economic progress continues to move in the right direction, that 
policy matters, and that we can make it turn out right in the end somehow 
(if not live happily ever after). 
While incentive theory is one of several important IP frameworks 
that could benefit from considering emotions more intentionally,44 other 
obvious emotional plays occur in IP. A quick (and necessarily incomplete) 
spin around different areas of IP illuminates many ways in which 
emotions are embedded within the field. Of course, copyright law’s 
protection of expressive content provokes positive and negative feelings 
on the part of both authors and consumers of those works. For example, 
authors may feel angry or outraged when their works of authorship are 
changed or used without authorization,45 or when they cannot control the 
rights to their own works due to industry overreach.46 Similar affective 
41. Ouellette, supra note 10. 
42. Mark A. Lemley, Faith-Based Intellectual Property, 62 UCLA L. REV. 1328, 1336 (2015). 
43. Shyamkrishna Balganesh, The Folklore and Symbolism of Authorship in American
Copyright Law, 54 HOUS. L. REV. 403, 419 (2016) (quoting THURMAN W. ARNOLD, THE SYMBOLS 
OF GOVERNMENT 34 (1935)). 
44. Another is the myth of IP uniformity. See, e.g., Sharon K. Sandeen, The Myth of Uniformity 
in IP Laws, 24 J. INTELL. PROP. L. 277 (2018). 
45. Cour de cassation [Cass.] [Supreme Court for Judicial Matters] 1e civ., May 28, 1991, Bull 
civ. I, No. 172 (Fr.); see also, Nicholas Swyrydenko, Comment, Film Artists Bushwhacked by the
Coloroids: One-Hundredth Congress to the Rescue?, 22 AKRON L. REV. 359 (1989) (describing
controversy over colorization of John Huston’s films who complained of being “bushwhacked by the 
coloroids”). 
46. Anastasia Tsioulcas, Look What They Made Her Do: Taylor Swift To Re-Record Her
Catalog, NPR (Aug. 22, 2019, 11:14 AM), https://www.npr.org/2019/08/22/753393630/look-what-
they-made-her-do-taylor-swift-to-re-record-her-catalog [https://perma.cc/FY6Q-SDL2]. 
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responses may occur in response to appropriation of cultural heritage that 
may not be protected by copyright, such as oral performances.47 These 
negative emotions are often subsumed within the doctrinal categories of 
moral rights or attribution rights, but also undergird discussions of 
infringement and fair use.48 On the positive emotional side, copyrighted 
content can elicit delight, joy, or even awe. Both Madhavi Sunder and 
Julie Cohen have explored the intrinsic emotional value of playing with 
copyrighted works, which then can enhance educational impacts of these 
works.49 Happy engagement with inventions and trademark designs, by 
either the owners or putative infringers, can also further overall 
understanding and learning, which then furthers the goals of IP.50 Camilla 
Hrdy and Daniel Brean even claim that science fiction, viewed primarily 
as fanciful works within the realm of copyright, can lead to the furthering 
of technological progress via patented inventions.51 
In legal practice, emotions are key to decisions made by juries and 
judges.52 Indeed, law and emotions scholarship often focuses on the 
litigation space because of the palpable emotional rhetoric deployed in 
jury trials.53 In his extensive analysis of the business and economic aspects 
of IP, Robert Merges documents a sea change in patent infringement 
litigation since 1982, when general litigators started to replace specialized 
patent lawyers in the courtroom. This change is presumably in part due to 
the formers’ effective deployment of emotion to juries, compared to the 
patent lawyers’ long custom of making technical arguments to the 
47. Angela R. Riley, Recovering Collectivity: Group Rights to Intellectual Property in
Indigenous Communities, 18 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 175, 186 (2000). 
48. See, e.g., Trevor G. Reed, Fair Use As Cultural Appropriation, 109 CAL. L. REV. 
(forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3456164
[https://perma.cc/K48S-LUQS]. 
49. See generally Madhavi Sunder, Intellectual Property in Experience, 117 MICH. L. REV. 
197 (2018); JULIE E. COHEN, CONFIGURING THE NETWORKED SELF (2012) (discussing critical 
importance of play in human development). 
50. See 8 Ann., c. 19 (1710) (“An Act for the Encouragement of Learning, by Vesting the
Copies of Printed Books in the Authors or Purchasers of such Copies, during the Times therein 
mentioned”), http://www.copyrighthistory.com/anne.html [https://perma.cc/V2JR-DJDA]; see also 
U.S. CONST. art. I, § 8, cl. 8; Copyright Act of 1790, 1 Stat. 124, amended by Act of 1802, 2 Stat. 
171. But see Diane Leenheer Zimmerman, The Statute of Anne and Its Progeny: Variations Without
a Theme, 47 HOUS. L. REV. 965, 971 (2010) (tracing ambiguity in the act’s “encouragement of
learning” goal). 
51. Camilla Alexandra Hrdy & Daniel Harris Brean, Enabling Science Fiction, 27 MICH. 
TELECOMM. & TECH. L. REV. (forthcoming 2021), https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?
abstract_id=3748840 [https://perma.cc/5MCL-5SR4].  
52. See, e.g., Ellsworth & Dougherty, supra note 12. 
53. See, e.g., Maroney, Field Evolves, supra note 3, at 5–6 (examining the emotional decision-
making of judges and jurors). 
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bench.54 Less flamboyant models of emotionally informed decision-
making may involve patent office examiners or judges who engage in 
intuitions about patent eligibility, as pointed out by Emily Michiko 
Morris,55 or judges who determine the reach of an equitable defense such 
as patent misuse, as Christina Laser has documented.56 These quieter 
examples arguably involve reliance upon emotions by legal actors in 
response to indeterminate legal standards such as “technology” or 
“fairness.” The assessment of enhanced damages necessarily includes an 
analysis of the patent defendant’s subjective wantonness in committing 
infringement, which arguably also includes an evaluation of the emotional 
state of the defendant, as assessed by the decision-maker.57 
Fear looms large as an emotion in all areas of litigation. No doubt, 
all IP defendants experience the emotion of fear, as Mark Schultz 
observed in copyright infringement litigation strategies pursued by the 
recording industry.58 Members of Congress may also respond to fear-
based arguments as they consider proposed legislation. For example, 
testimony at the hearings on the Coons-Tillis proposed amendments to the 
eligibility provisions of the Patent Act raised the fearful specter of other 
nations breaching potentially unprotected technologies such as AI, 
quantum computing, and 5G, as well as biotech products such as 
biologics.59 In trade secret law and policy, it is easy to discern more than 
a trace of fear-based framing of evidence and arguments.60 And in 
addition to fear, feelings of betrayal and outrage often underlie trade secret 
litigation more generally.61 
In the international IP arena, geographical indications (GIs) often 
trigger national pride, evidenced by the on-going debate between the old 
54. ROBERT P. MERGES, AMERICAN PATENT LAW: A BUSINESS AND ECONOMIC HISTORY
(forthcoming 2021). 
55. Emily Michiko Morris, Intuitive Patenting, 66 S.C. L. REV. 61 (2014). 
56. See Christa J. Laser, Equitable Defenses in Patent Law, 75 U. MIAMI L. REV. 1 (2020).
57. See Dmitry Karshtedt, Enhancing Patent Damages, 51 U.C. DAVIS L. REV. 1427 (2018). 
58. Mark F. Schultz, Fear and Norms and Rock & Roll: What Jambands Can Teach Us About 
Persuading People to Obey Copyright Law, 21 BERKELEY TECH. L.J. 651, 655 (2006) (“The music 
industry has responded with lawsuits—mostly pursued by the Recording Industry Association of 
America (RIAA)—calculated to deter file-sharers. The recording industry hopes these lawsuits will 
change the behavior of file-sharers by instilling fear in potential file-sharers.”) 
59. The State of Patent Eligibility in America: Part I: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on
Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019); The State of Patent Eligibility 
in America: Part II: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Intellectual Prop. of the S. Comm. on the 
Judiciary, 116th Cong. (2019). 
60. See Rochelle Cooper Dreyfuss & Orly Lobel, Economic Espionage as Reality or Rhetoric: 
Equating Trade Secrecy with National Security, 20 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 419 (2016). 
61. ORLY LOBEL, YOU DON’T OWN ME: HOW MATTEL V. MGA ENTERTAINMENT EXPOSED 
BARBIE’S DARK SIDE (2018). 
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world countries that would like to protect their cultural heritage though 
GIs, and new world countries that would prefer to imitate or possibly even 
improve upon IP-protected goods with specifically identifiable cultural 
origins.62 In my recent work on certification marks, I have emphasized 
soft regulatory or market-based measures through what is sometimes 
termed “fair trade.”63 By doing so, perhaps I am succumbing to my strong 
emotional attachment to the idea that IP can promote human flourishing 
through a social justice framing of IP.64 However, this work is also a 
critique of conventional trademark legal doctrine, which centers around 
an out-moded assumption of the source of origin of a good or service: a 
source that used to be guilds and local manufacturers,65 by contrast to the 
brand holding companies which dominate today’s global trade 
networks.66  The IP community’s collective attachment to certain features 
of trademark doctrine resembles our attachment to incentive theory in 
copyright and patent law. 
These passing examples show that the emotional context and content 
of IP is pervasive. By recognizing, and even centering, emotions in IP, a 
more accurate understanding of this field may emerge. The next part 
delves into specific emotions, in order to explore their impact more 
thoroughly. 
III. ILLUMINATING FURTHER THE NEXUS OF IP AND EMOTIONS
A full consideration of emotions and IP would review not just such
“familiar emotions as anger, compassion, mercy, vengeance, and 
hatred . . . [but also] happiness, guilt, forgiveness, romantic love, 
62. See Irene Calboli, Of Markets, Culture, and Terroir: The Unique Economic and Culture-
Related Benefits of Geographical Indications of Origin, in INTERNATIONAL INTELLECTUAL 
PROPERTY 433 (Daniel Gervais ed., 2015). 
63. Margaret Chon, Marks of Rectitude, 77 FORDHAM L. REV. 2311 [hereinafter Chon, Marks 
of Rectitude]. See also TIM BARTLEY, SEBASTIAN KOOS, HIRAM SAMEL, GUSTAVO SETRINI & NIK 
SUMMERS, LOOKING BEHIND THE LABEL: GLOBAL INDUSTRIES AND THE CONSCIENTIOUS 
CONSUMER 29 (2015) (describing the “puzzle of rules”—by which the contradictions of neoliberal 
markets are incompletely addressed through market-based rule-making projects, “from 
standardization of accounting procedures to the rules for fairness and sustainability”). 
64. Chon, Marks of Rectitude, supra note 63. 
65. JEFFREY BELSON, CERTIFICATION AND COLLECTIVE MARKS 9-14 (2017) (describing the
regulatory origins of certification and collective marks in guilds beginning in the eleventh century); 
Mark P. McKenna, The Normative Foundations of Trademark Law, 82 NOTRE DAME L. REV. 1839, 
1850 (2007). 
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gratitude, loyalty, envy, regret, and our own engagement with hope.”67 
This part focuses on two emotional responses in particular—nostalgia and 
hope—to begin to determine specific ways in which emotions can be 
helpful or possibly harmful in IP law and policymaking. Nostalgia is 
concerned with reconstructing a past and mediating between that past and 
inevitable life changes.68 Hope is concerned with constructing an 
optimistic future. Both emotions are seemingly positive, at least on the 
surface. Interestingly, however, emotions researchers posit that both these 
emotions can be responses to adversity, hardship, and threats, whether 
perceived or real. And both can minimize the costs associated with either 
past or future experiences, respectively. 
A. Nostalgia
A term coined in the late 1600s,69 nostalgia is now commonly
understood to mean a pleasure in remembering or reliving a past 
experience—smelling a food that you used to eat as a child, for example.70 
A leading researcher states that nostalgia serves multiple functions: 
[N]ostalgia serves an essential psychological function [in] that it is a
highly social emotion. It connects us to other people. It does that and
[sic] so many beautiful ways. In the beginning, when we’re very young,
it’s part of what bonds us to the most important people in our life, our
parents, our siblings, our friends. As we go through life, it can broaden
67. Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2046 (footnote omitted). 
68. Speaking of Psychology: Does Nostalgia Have a Psychological Purpose?, AM. PSYCHOL. 
ASS’N (November 2019), https://www.apa.org/research/action/speaking-of-psychology/nostalgia 
[https://perma.cc/SQ93-GHPB] [hereinafter Speaking of Psychology] (interview with Krystine 
Batcho).  Batcho says: 
[N]ostalgia is an emotional experience that unifies. One example of this is it helps to unite 
our sense of who we are, our self, our identity over time. Because over time we change
constantly we change in incredible ways. We’re not anywhere near the same as we were
when we were three years old, for example. Nostalgia by motivating us to remember the
past in our own life helps to unite us to that authentic self and remind us of who we have 
been and then compare that to who we feel we are today. 
Id. See also Taylor A. FioRito & Clay Routledge, Is Nostalgia a Past or Future-Oriented Experience? 
Affective, Behavioral, Social Cognitive, and Neuroscientific Evidence, 11 FRONTIERS PSYCHOL. 1133 
(2020) (“when individuals engage in nostalgic reflection, they are not hiding in the past. They are 
accessing meaningful memories from the past in order to help them approach the future with 
purpose.”). 
69. Nicole Johnson, The Surprising Way Nostalgia Can Help Us Cope with the
Pandemic, NAT’L GEOGRAPHIC (July 21, 2020), https://www.nationalgeographic.com/science/
2020/07/surprising-role-of-nostalgia-during-coronavirus-pandemic.html [https://perma.cc/E3UD-
H9HW] (attributed to Swiss medical student Johannes Hofer in 1688). 
70. If madeleines come to mind, you are not alone. MARCEL PROUST, REMEMBRANCE OF
THINGS PAST (1913). 
15
Chon: Emotions and Intellectual Property Law
Published by IdeaExchange@UAkron, 2021
544 AKRON LAW REVIEW [54:529 
out and extend to a wider sphere of the people we interact with. It’s a 
social connectedness phenomenon and nostalgia is in that sense a very 
healthy pro-social emotion.71 
Nostalgia is one likely reason for the unusually bi-partisan ambience 
in the U.S. Congressional hearings on the Music Modernization Act. All 
participants easily agreed with each other that something needed to be 
done to protect individual musicians—specifically song-writers and 
recording artists, as well as music publishers—from being shut out of the 
profits made by internet streaming services (most of which had been going 
to the record labels).72 In our collective cultural imagination, the figure of 
the musician, whether in the guise of the composer, the song-writer, the 
instrumentalist, or the singer, is one that has the potential to transcend our 
hyper-polarized political environment.73 Musicians can channel collective 
nostalgia for past musical works, as well as trigger other positive 
emotions, such as gratitude, generosity, elevation, and awe—and we can 
share these feelings with people who have very different political views 
from our own. 
The hearings demonstrate the positive role that nostalgia can play 
with regard to artistic and expressive works, which often trigger emotional 
responses. Nostalgia provided a pro-social emotional platform for 
members of Congress to reach across the aisle in an increasingly brutal 
and frightening political world. Whether one is from a red or a blue state, 
we can all share a national nostalgia about certain musical works, which 
can then turn into pride over the creative boundlessness represented in our 
shared cultural history. 
Yet there are costs to this particular emotional response. Nostalgia 
can minimize past harms and even glorify past injustices.74 According to 
a recent summary of nostalgia research: 
71. Speaking of Psychology, supra note 68. 
72. 164 CONG. REC. S6259–61 (daily ed. Sept. 18, 2018). 
73. Recently, I have viewed several documentary films about musicians that formed the
soundtrack to my high school and college years, such as Jakob Dylan’s Echo in the Canyon and the 
documentary about Linda Ronstadt, The Sound of My Voice. ECHO IN THE CANYON (Greenwich 
Entertainment 2019); LINDA RONSTADT: THE SOUND OF MY VOICE (Greenwich Entertainment 2019). 
74. As Krystine Batcho, a leading researcher in the field of nostalgia, recently writes,
“Historical nostalgia is often concurrent with a deep dissatisfaction with the present and a preference 
for the way things were long ago. Unlike personal nostalgia, someone who experiences historical 
nostalgia might have a more cynical perspective of the world, one colored by pain, trauma, regret or 
adverse childhood experiences.” Krystine Batcho, The Psychological Benefits—and Trappings—of 
Nostalgia, CONVERSATION (June 5, 2017, 8:11 PM), https://theconversation.com/the-psychological-
benefits-and-trappings-of-nostalgia-77766 [https://perma.cc/57K2-2V9H].  
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[N]ostalgia is not just a wistful glow associated with pleasurable events
and experiences. It is an innate response to pain or distress, and, in some
sense, a coming home. What’s more, cognitive scientists say, a defining
trait of nostalgia is its capacity to distort the past.75
In addition, “it’s frequently triggered by low moods, loneliness, and 
even a sense of meaninglessness. These triggers suggest[] that nostalgia 
might be a kind of defense mechanism, a way to maintain resiliency 
during periods of anxiety, despair, and existential distress.”76 As leading 
nostalgia researcher Krystine Batcho states, “[i]f people are unhappy for 
any reason with how things are today, they’re more likely then to 
experience this sense that things must have been better in the past. How 
far they have to go in terms of their longing can depend upon how much 
they know about history.”77 
In the context of musical copyright, nostalgia may flatten and 
essentialize the experiences of many musicians who do not have the place 
in history they deserve. Some musicians in the past were deemed to carry 
threatening messages, such as Link Wray, an American Indian affiliated 
with the Shawnee tribe, whose revolutionary guitar sound in his 1958 song 
Rumble, was banned by US radio stations because the music (not words) 
apparently challenged the status quo.78 This sensitivity to subversion of a 
particular national identity includes well-known musicians such as Igor 
Stravinsky. Invited to Cambridge, Massachusetts in 1944 to deliver the 
Charles Eliot Norton lectures at Harvard, he prepared a controversial 
arrangement of the Star Spangled Banner that provoked a police warning, 
based on a law that is apparently still on the books.79 




77. Speaking of Psychology, supra note 68. 
78. Madman Films, Rumble: The Indians Who Rocked the World—Official Trailer, YOUTUBE 
(Aug. 8, 2017), https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=8E1VVadxjRw [https://perma.cc/4K72-FMEZ]. 
79. Stravinsky’s “Illegal” Arrangement of “The Star Spangled Banner” (1944), OPEN 
CULTURE (July 4, 2015), http://www.openculture.com/2015/07/stravinskys-illegal-arrangement-of-
the-star-spangled-banner-1944.html [https://perma.cc/EX92-4UCH]. The statute states: 
Whoever plays, sings or renders the “Star-Spangled Banner” in any public place, theater, 
motion picture hall, restaurant or cafe, or at any public entertainment, other than as a whole 
and separate composition or number, without embellishment or addition in the way of 
national or other melodies, or whoever plays, sings or renders the “Star Spangled Banner”, 
or any part thereof, as dance music, as an exit march or as a part of a melody of any kind, 
shall be punished by a fine of not more than one hundred dollars. 
MASS. GEN. LAWS ANN. ch. 264 § 9 (West 2020). 
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Olufunmilayo Arewa,80 K.J. Greene,81 Robert Brauneis,82 as well as 
James Boyle and Jennifer Jenkins,83 collaborating with the late Keith 
Aoki, have written specifically about past unequal distribution of the 
benefits of music copyright to black artists. We may not fully absorb these 
and other cautionary tales from the past when over-relying on nostalgia. 
Inequality within the music industry has present-day impacts, whether by 
missed royalties or reputational benefits to past or current artists. As Mary 
LaFrance concludes in her detailed analysis of the Music Modernization 
Act: 
[I]f the true purpose of the CLASSICS Act is “to enable older artists and
their families to benefit financially from their creativity,”the Act shows
a lack of imagination. By subjecting pre-1972 recordings to the same §
114 royalty scheme as copyrighted recordings, and by not giving the
recording artists any termination rights, the Act ensures that the lion’s
share of the financial rewards from the newly recognized right will go
to the record labels rather than the artists.84
Nostalgia can strongly influence how we experience and respond to 
challenging circumstances. During the COVID-19 pandemic, for 
example, we might turn to the comforting and familiar cultural (and IP-
protected!) products of the past.85 Nostalgia’s immense power to comfort 
and bring people together, as well as its potential to create a falsely 
positive picture of the past, is increasingly understood. 
80. Olufunmilayo B. Arewa, From J.C. Bach to Hip Hop: Musical Borrowing, Copyright and 
Cultural Context, 84 N.C. L. REV. 547 (2006). 
81. K.J. Greene, Intellectual Property at the Intersection of Race and Gender: Lady Sings the 
Blues, 16 AM. U. J. GENDER SOC. POL’Y & L. 365 (2008); K.J. Greene, “Copynorms,” Black Cultural 
Production, and the Debate over African-American Reparations, 25 CARDOZO ARTS & ENT. L.J. 
1179 (2008). 
82. Robert Brauneis, Copyright, Music, and Race: The Case of Mirror Cover Recordings (Geo. 
Wash. U. Legal Studies Research Paper No. 2020-56, Geo. Wash. U. L. Sch. Public Law Research 
Paper No. 2020-56, May 2, 2020), https://ssrn.com/abstract=3591113 [https://perma.cc/H5VS-
RAMH]. 
83. JAMES BOYLE, JENNIFER JENKINS & KEITH AOKI, THEFT! A HISTORY OF MUSIC (2017). 
84. Mary LaFrance, Music Modernization and the Labyrinth of Streaming, 2 BUS. 
ENTREPRENEURSHIP & TAX L. REV. 310, 338 (2018) (footnote omitted) (quoting H.R. REP. NO. 115-
651, at 15 (2018)).  
85. Speaking of Psychology, supra note 68. Batcho mentions: 
TV shows that are being rebooted or were popular in the ‘90s bands from long ago have
reunited and are going out on tour. There’s places like Buzzfeed often feature, top 20 lists 
like top 20 toys from the 1980s that sort of thing. People really flock to that and want to
share their memories of certain toy. 
Id. 
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B. Hope
Another positive emotion associated with IP law and policy-making
is hope. Also viewed as a positive emotion, hope is often distinguished 
from optimism in that hope is more likely to drive actions towards goals.86  
Australian legal scholar Peter Drahos wrote about the crucial role of 
public hope on the part of developing countries in the context of 
international IP treatymaking, and specifically the TRIPS negotiations.87 
Drahos is the one of first IP scholars to address directly the role of emotion 
in IP policymaking, without embedding it in a behavioral economics 
framework. 
Describing hope as “constituted of imagining and believing in the 
possibility that some state of affairs in the future will come to pass,”88 
Drahos wrote: 
The assumption of rationality has led to the dominance of calculative 
approaches in international relations, with game theory providing the 
dominant structure of calculation that is used to study decision making. 
Yet the assumption that [nation-]states in certain circumstances are 
emotional actors is no less plausible than the rationality assumption. In 
fact, it may be more plausible.89 
The subject of Shepard Fairey’s “Hope” poster, former President Obama, 
famously invoked many emotional tropes in his 2011 State of the Union 
address: 
We measure progress by the success of our people, by the jobs they can 
find, and the quality of life those jobs offer, by the prospects of a small 
business owner who dreams of turning a good idea into a thriving 
enterprise, by the opportunities for a better life that we pass on to our 
children. 
That’s the project the American people want us to work on. Together. 
. . . . 
86. Marcus Roth & Philipp Hammelstein, Hope as an Emotion of Expectancy: First
Assessment Results, GMS PSYCHO-SOC.-MED., Apr. 12, 2007; Kirsten Weir, Mission Impossible: 
Being Hopeful is Good for You – and Psychologists’ Research is Pinpointing Ways to Foster the 
Feeling, 44 MONITOR ON PSYCHOL. 42 (2013); Theories of Emotion, LUMEN: BOUNDLESS PSYCHOL., 
https://courses.lumenlearning.com/boundless-psychology/chapter/theories-of-emotion/ 
[https://perma.cc/X6JK-V3E5]. 
87. Peter Drahos, Trading in Public Hope, 592 ANNALS AM. ACAD. POL. & SOC. SCI. 18 
(2004). 
88. Id. at 19. 
89. Id. at 23. 
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. . . [But t]he rules have changed. 
In a single generation, revolutions in technology have transformed the 
way we live, work, and do business. . . . 
. . . . 
The first step in winning the future is encouraging American innovation. 
None of us can predict with certainty what the next big industry will be 
or where the new jobs will come from. Thirty years ago, we couldn’t 
know that something called the Internet would lead to an economic 
revolution. 
What we can do—what America does better than anyone else—is spark 
the creativity and imagination of our people.90  
President Obama’s speech is a robust narrative of hope, invoking 
innovation, entrepreneurship, and creativity, all to indicate a future in 
which every American can reap the benefits of technology to unify us as 
diverse nation. And it resonates rhetorically, even as I personally have 
some doubts substantively.91 Along the same lines, the Trump 
Administration quickly established an Office of American Innovation. 
While it is not clear what the office accomplished beyond a few meetings, 
its very name projects the same hopeful message that America is great (or 
will be made great again) through American innovation.92 
Individual hope is certainly important in keeping one foot in front of 
the other, in spite of the challenging circumstances that life can throw at 
you.93 On a personal level, my family of origin has always been and still 
is intensely idealistic. I speculate that this focus on romanticizing life’s 
realities must have been a partial response by my parents to traumatizing 
first-hand experiences, such as forcible colonization of their country of 
birth followed by a brutal civil war. However, the negative side of hope, 
especially collective hope,94 is disappointment, or worse, from unrealistic 
90. 157 CONG. REC. 640 (2011). 
91. As Anjali Vats points out, Obama’s invocation of the “American Dream was intertwined
with positive, yet intensely competitive and oppositional, public feelings that were also deeply 
racialized.” VATS, supra note 32, at 115. 
92. Tajha Chappellet-Lanier, Trump’s Office of American Innovation Must Be More
Transparent, Senators Say, FEDSCOOP (May 2, 2018), https://www.fedscoop.com/office-american-
innovation-white-house-trump-senators-letter/ [https://perma.cc/F764-875Q]. 
93. Elizabeth Bernstein, An Emotion We All Need More Of, WALL STREET J. (Mar. 21, 2016, 
4:45 PM), https://www.wsj.com/articles/an-emotion-we-all-need-more-of-1458581680 [https://
perma.cc/FA3E-XWRN].  
94. See Drahos, supra note 87, at 20.  Defining the concept of “collective hope,” Drahos writes: 
Daniel Bar-Tal (2001) identifies seven conditions of collective hope including the
necessity that the emotion be widely experienced in a society, that the beliefs that trigger
20
Akron Law Review, Vol. 54 [2021], Iss. 3, Art. 2
https://ideaexchange.uakron.edu/akronlawreview/vol54/iss3/2
2020] EMOTIONS AND INTELLECTUAL PROPERTY LAW 549 
expectations. Corporate marketing efforts and press releases often inflate 
hope when discussing the fruits of technological progress. Consider 
Google’s former slogan “Don’t be evil”95 and its current admonition “Do 
the right thing”96—or Facebook’s now incredibly ironic “Be connected. 
Be discovered. Be on Facebook.”97 
With regard to hope, Drahos asserts that: 
It is this mental act of creating a sense of expectation or anticipation 
about the future that seems to make hope an important psychological 
resource for dealing with a future made uncertain by a threat of some 
kind. . . . Individuals can possess and access the expectation, even if the 
event to which the expectation relates is highly uncertain. This may in 
fact be the only certainty in times when the threat is very great.”98 
IP scholars are not exempt from this tendency to have unrealistically 
hopeful and perhaps even utopian expectations for the unpredictable 
impacts of technological change. We might remember, for example, the 
anticipation a quarter-century ago of the internet’s potential as a liberating 
space for semiotic democracy.99 Compare our enthusiasm then to the 
reality we find ourselves in now: surrounded by disinformation and malice 
fueled by social media. The early internet libertarian idea that information 
wants to be free,100 carried by the hope of ultimate unconstrained liberty, 
the emotion be widely shared, that the cultural products of the society express the emotion 
and the beliefs to which it is connected, and that the emotion and beliefs are part of 
collective memory. Public hope is hope that is articulated or held by actors acting 
politically in relation to societal goals. 
Id. 
95. Kate Conger, Google Removes “Don’t Be Evil” Clause from Its Code of Conduct, (May
18, 2018, 5:31 PM), https://gizmodo.com/google-removes-nearly-all-mentions-of-dont-be-evil-from-
1826153393 [https://perma.cc/5ZAA-Q9C9]. 
96. Id. 
97. Double Talk at Facebook: Pandora’s Box in Mark’s Dorm, IRISH EXAMINER, (July 18,
2018, 1:00 AM), https://www.irishexaminer.com/opinion/ourview/arid-30855912.html [https://
perma.cc/WG2Y-PNDW]. 
98. Id. at 21–22. 
99. This term is attributed to John Fiske, a media studies scholar, 
to describe a world where audiences freely and widely engage in the use of cultural
symbols in response to the forces of media. A semiotic democracy enables the audience,
to a varying degree, to ‘resist,’ ‘subvert,’ and ‘recode’ certain cultural symbols to express 
meanings that are different from the ones intended by their creators, thereby empowering 
consumers, rather than producers. 
Sonia K. Katyal, Semiotic Disobedience, 84 WASH. U. L. REV. 489, 489–90 (2006). 
100. John Perry Barlow, The Economy of Ideas: A Framework for Patents and Copyrights in
the Digital Age. (Everything You Know About Intellectual Property is Wrong.), WIRED (Mar. 1, 1994, 
12:00 PM), https://www.wired.com/1994/03/economy-ideas/ [https://perma.cc/T98N-V4PL] 
(famously stating that “Information [w]ants to [b]e [f]ree” and that memes “self-reproduce, they 
interact with their surroundings and adapt to them, they mutate, they persist. They evolve to fill the 
21
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is dangerously daft in light of the events culminating in the attack on our 
nation’s capital on January 6, 2021. 
Thus, ideas of authorship, creativity, inventorship, progress, and so 
on both produce and are reproduced by strong emotions such nostalgia 
and hope. These emotions tend to influence law in directions that would 
be different if wholly rational legal actors were responsive only to 
evidence-based information. Positive emotions along with their 
associated framing of information keep us optimistic about our future as 
a powerful yet fallible, and even vulnerable, species. And they give us 
psychological incentives to propel ourselves towards a distant goal, vague 
in its exact details, but perhaps not wholly unattainable. 
To be sure, if these policy choices do not align completely with 
realities on the ground, that may not be a cause for concern. But when the 
emotional valences of IP are deployed for policy ends that are wildly 
incongruent with either creative realities or social welfare outcomes, we 
should be concerned. Collective hope in particular, is important—possibly 
crucial—in motivating legal actors, as well as others, to work for positive 
social change. Yet hope can be, and is, misused and manipulatively 
marketed by what Drahos called the merchants of hope—whether by 
political or corporate campaigns. Emotions also can mask legitimate 
concerns that should be included within a rational analysis of science and 
knowledge—and the legal institutions tasked with regulating them. IP 
legal actors tend to grasp tightly to the hopeful narratives that our 
innovation systems will inevitably bring the fruits of technological 
progress to Americans. But they rarely ask the homeless persons in 
California how well Silicon Valley is working for them. 
IV. CONCLUSION
Law and emotions scholars claim that a greater consideration of 
emotions “can inform both the more modest end of improving legal 
doctrine, and the more ambitious aspiration of using law to produce 
desirable emotional effects.”101  As Bandes and Blumenthal, put it, 
“Institutions are, inevitably, constructed in light of assumptions about 
emotional dynamics, and these assumptions should be illuminated and 
evaluated. Knowledge of emotional dynamics can be utilized to 
empty niches of their local environments, which are, in this case the surrounding belief systems and 
cultures of their hosts, namely, us.”). 
101. Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2033. 
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restructure incentive systems and construct more effective legal 
institutions.”102 
Abrams and Keren have trifurcated their efforts into illumination 
(where a consideration of emotions can show where our existing accounts 
of law may be incomplete), investigation, and integration.103 This article 
dwells upon the first two prongs, illumination and investigation, claiming 
merely that important IP questions are on the table. Any answers require 
careful analysis, including of emotions, regarding the underlying purposes 
and benefits of IP. 
If this article does not purport to offer any specific suggestions for 
legal change at this juncture, where does this leave us? IP legal actors 
probably can agree on the need for on-going and effective law reform, if 
for no other reason than because technological change is accelerating, and 
IP is the field of law most closely aligned to “technology,” whatever that 
“weasel word,” as Judge Michel recently put it,104 means. Furthermore, 
philosophers of science point out that scientific objectivity is almost never 
value-neutral, and that we all should carry around with us a huge backpack 
of humility regarding the limits of what we know.105 They point out that 
much of what people accept as knowledge, science, and truth is affected 
by cultural and social contexts, constraints, and opportunities. The making 
of knowledge, like any other social endeavor, is . . . well, social.106 And 
that social construction of knowledge includes our individual and 
collective emotional responses. The emotional energy represented by IP 
can be harnessed quite easily into directions that do not serve IP’s ultimate 
102. Bandes & Blumenthal, supra note 30, at 173. 
103. Abrams & Keren, supra note 1, at 2033. They elaborate: 
The first dimension, “Illumination,” stands for the task of highlighting the often
unacknowledged way that emotions are implicated in a particular legal setting. The
second, “Investigation” reflects the interdisciplinary effort to better understand the nature 
and characteristics of the specific emotions at issue. The third, “Integration,” represents 
the challenge of incorporating the new affective insights gleaned through this effort into
normative suggestions for legal change. Not every example of law and emotions
scholarship encompasses each of these dimensions. 
Id. at 2033–34. 
104. Steve Brachmann & Eileen McDermott, First Senate Hearing on 101 Underscores That
“There’s More Work to Be Done,” IP WATCHDOG (June 4, 2019), 
https://www.ipwatchdog.com/2019/06/04/first-senate-hearing-on-101-underscores-that-theres-
more-work-to-be-done/ [https://perma.cc/CSU7-QQ5S] (quoting Former Chief Judge of the Court of 
Appeals for the Federal Circuit, Paul Michel). 
105. Sandra Harding, Rethinking Standpoint Epistemology: What is “Strong” Objectivity?, 36
CENTENNIAL REV. 437 (1992). 
106. Timothy M. Lenton & Bruno Latour, Gaia 2.0: Could Humans Add Some Level of Self-
Awareness to Earth’s Self-Regulation?, 361 SCIENCE 1066, 1067 (Sept. 14, 2018) (describing 
networks and politics in climate change decision-making). 
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goals, including dividing people of otherwise shared commitments toward 
enhancing the power of creativity and innovation for social good.107 
One of the most challenging of our current technology-related issues 
is how the benefits of social media seem to be hijacked by negative 
emotions and their consequences. In addition, any regulatory approaches 
must contend with the emotional impetus for, and consequences of, our 
communicative activities, including but not limited to the neurologically 
addictive impacts on the pleasure centers of the brain. By necessity, the 
law and emotions field is cross-disciplinary, drawing simultaneously from 
neuroscience and the humanities.108 IP has much to contribute to and 
benefit from this conversation, as well as to the larger goal of promoting 
social welfare. 
The two cultures problem109 of the post-war military industrial era is 
completely dwarfed today by what some have described as post-industrial 
IP.110 This includes the move from IP-protected goods to IP-protected 
services111 as one of one of many strategies to address post-scarcity. 
Rampant concentration of informational power is occurring within what I 
have termed cognitive capitalist business models.112 Attention, 
undergirded by emotion, is the key transactional vector in our post-
scarcity and information-saturated digital economy. For example, as 
consumers of IP-protected content, we are all increasingly exposed only 
to the side of the story that we already want to see or hear.113 This is a 
feature, not a bug, of our network-based media business models. 
Characterized by passionately partisan politics, our current historical 
107. Ouellette, supra note 10. 
108. Abrams & Keren, supra note 1. 
109. C.P. Snow, supra note 29, at 3 (“the intellectual life of the whole of western society
increasingly being split into two polar groups”). 
110. Julie E. Cohen, Property as Institutions for Resources: Lessons from and for IP, 94 TEX. 
L. REV. 1, 6 (2015). 
111. Sean M. O’Connor, The Multiple Levels of “Property” in IP and Why That Matters for the 
Natural Versus Regulatory IP Debates, 5 GEO. MASON L. REV. (Forthcoming 2018), 
https://privpapers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3252253 [https://perma.cc/W2AQ-4K45]. 
112. Margaret Chon, Slow Logo: Brand Citizenship in Global Value Networks, 47 U.C. DAVIS 
L. REV. 935 (2014); Margaret Chon, Tracermarks: A Proposed Information Intervention, 53 HOUS. 
L. REV. 421 (2015); Margaret Chon, Trademark Goodwill as a Public Good: Brands and Innovations 
in Corporate Social Responsibility, 21 LEWIS & CLARK L. REV. 277 (2017).
113. These emotional responses seem to be exacerbated by what I once termed the “reversion 
effect,” that is, the tendency to revert to familiar cultural scripts through new technological means 
such as digital networked technologies. See Margaret Chon, Erasing Race? A Critical Race Feminist 
View of Internet Identity Shifting, 3 J. GENDER, RACE & JUST. 439, 441 (2000). This phenomenon, 
which I described in the context of racial identity, is now more generally referred to by terms such as 
“echo chambers,” “bubbles” or the “Daily Me”—that is, the proclivity to engage with social media 
content that only confirms our pre-existing cognitive biases and beliefs, because they make us feel 
better about ourselves. See, e.g., CASS R. SUNSTEIN, REPUBLIC.COM (2001) (coining the “Daily Me”).  
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moment is evidence enough that any comprehensive understanding of law 
and policymaking should include a serious consideration of the roles of 
emotions. Emotional responses might explain much of the post-fact 
society that we seem to find ourselves in right now. Information may have 
wanted to be free at one point in internet time, but we now know all too 
well that it always comes with a cost.114 
Today in IP, legal scholars can be skeptical about the basic 
parameters of IP systems and are willing to stand down from the siren 
calls of innovation and progress if these calls are leading us in the wrong 
direction. Some of us are even willing to state that IP in certain 
manifestations could be counter-productive to social welfare. By contrast, 
many IP makers, including lawmakers and policy-makers, are typically 
responding to short-term incentives—whether of the business or election 
cycle. Thus the IP knowledge network, to use Latourian terminology,115 
is fraught with misaligned incentives that point in different policy 
directions. Emotions provide some explanation for this disconnect. 
Regardless, in our current dialogues about IP, we typically do not 
acknowledge the individual and social contingencies in constructing our 
knowledge—the science, if you will—of IP law, including its emotional 
content. And this collective body of knowledge should include or even 
begin with acknowledging ourselves as emotional beings, in additional to 
rational actors.  Put negatively, if we continue to ignore or minimize 
emotions in IP, we also will continue to risk an incomplete conceptual 
configuration of IP, at the cost of thwarting the primary policy goals of 
this increasingly crucial area of law. 
114. Guy Pessach, Beyond IP—The Cost of Free: Informational Capitalism in a Post IP Era, 
54 OSGOODE HALL L.J. 225 (2016). 
115. Lenton & Latour, supra note 106. 
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